Security Vulnerabilities in Computer Systems


We aim to advance security measures and strategies at the architectural level to safeguard computing environments against various threats. A significant part of our work is focused on studying architectural side-channel attacks, as well as developing detection and mitigation techniques. We explore vulnerabilities like Spectre and Meltdown, aiming to understand their underlying mechanisms and create effective countermeasures to prevent sensitive information leakage. Additionally, we are actively working to enhance memory integrity for robust system security. One key area of our research is the Row Hammer phenomenon, where repeated access to a memory row can cause data corruption. By investigating this vulnerability, we seek to design memory protection mechanisms that prevent such attacks and ensure data integrity. Ultimately, our goal is to strengthen the foundations of computer systems and architectures to resist a diverse range of security threats. By staying at the forefront of this research, we aim to contribute to the development of more secure computing environments that can protect against emerging threats in an ever-evolving digital landscape.

Publications

  1. (Journal) NoHammer: Preventing Row Hammer With Last-Level Cache Management
  2. (Conference) A Resiliency Coordinator Against Malicious Attacks for Cyber-Physical Systems
  3. (Journal) CPS 환경에 대한 Flush+Reload 캐시 부 채널 공격의 영향 및 Flush+Reload 캐시 부 채널 공격 탐지 기술
  4. (Patent) Method and apparatus for detecting cache side channel attack
  5. (Patent) Method and Apparatus for detecting cache side channel attack using trusted execution environment
  6. (Journal) Defending Against Flush+Reload Attack With DRAM Cache by Bypassing Shared SRAM Cache
  7. (Poster) Exploiting DRAM Cache for Defending Against Flush+Reload Attack
  8. (Patent) Method and System for securing a communication channel for the trusted execution environment